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Naked error or FashioN BluNder? CoNdoms aNd 
FaNCy Wear iN the high Court
■
Yap Po Jen*
Recently, Anselmo Reyes J in the Court of First Instance handed down two 
decisions on trade marks registration. In the first, Re Naked, his Lordship allowed 
the applicant to register the word “Naked” as a trade mark for condoms whilst in 
the second, Re Alldressedup, the learned judge denied an application to register 
“alldressedup” as a trade mark for jewellery, articles made from animal skins and 
clothing. This Comment seeks to argue that the approaches taken by Reyes J in 
the two cases vis-à-vis the registrability of trademarks are inconsistent with each 
other. It is also this author’s submission that Re Naked was correctly decided 
whilst the second applicant’s “alldressedup” mark was wrongly denied registration 
for the class of goods relating to jewellery and articles made from animal skins and 
was correctly rejected for the class on clothing. 
Introduction
Recently, two interesting decisions on trademark registration were handed 
down by Anselmo Reyes J in the Court of First Instance. In the first, Re 
Naked,1 his Lordship allowed the applicant to register the word “Naked” as 
a trade mark for condoms whilst in the second, Re Alldressedup,2 the learned 
judge denied an application to register “alldressedup” as a trade mark for 
Class 14,3 184 and 255 goods. 
This Comment seeks to argue that the approaches taken by Reyes J in 
the two cases vis-à-vis the registrability of trade marks are inconsistent with 
each other. It is this author’s submission that Re Naked was correctly de-
cided whilst the second applicant’s “alldressedup” mark was wrongly denied 
registration for Class 14 and 18 goods and was correctly rejected for Class 
25 goods. 
* Assistant Professor. University of Hong Kong. This author is grateful to Mr Alvin Chan for his in-
sightful comments.
1 Re Naked, [2009] 2 HKLRD 96.
2 Re Alldressedup International Pte Ltd [2009] HKEC 956.
3 Class 14 includes in particular jewellery and tie pins. 
4 Class 18 includes mainly leather, leather imitations, travel goods and does not include in par-
ticular clothes, footwear, headgear. 
5 Class 25 includes clothing, footwear and headgear. 
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Facts
In Re Naked, the applicant sought to register the word “Naked” as a trade 
mark for condoms. The Registrar of Trade Marks refused its application, 
holding that the word “naked” designated a characteristic of condoms and 
was descriptive under section 11(1)(c)6 of the Trade Marks Ordinance 
(TMO) and thus also lacked distinctiveness under section 11(1)(b).7 On 
appeal to the Court of First Instance, Reyes J disagreed with the Registrar’s 
findings. The learned judge held that the word “naked” did not “directly 
describe a characteristic”8 of condoms but “merely allude suggestively to it”9 
and could not be denied registration under section 11(1)(c) or (b). 
On the other hand, in Re Alldressedup, the applicant sought to register 
“alldressedup” as a trade mark for jewellery, articles made from animal skins 
and clothing. The Registrar denied the registration pursuant to section 
11(1)(b) and (c) of the TMO on the basis that the mark merely described 
that the applied-for goods were fancy or formal clothing or designed to 
match with fancy or formal clothing. This time, Reyes J agreed with the 
Registrar, holding that the mark was descriptive as the expression “all 
dressed up” “purely, simply and directly designates the purpose”10 of the 
items of clothing within the relevant classes. His Lordship also held that 
the mark was devoid of any distinctive character under section 11(1)(b) as 
it was generally descriptive of the three classes of goods in question.
Analysis of the Twin Decisions 
The crux of Reyes J’s conclusion on the registrability of “Naked” as a mark 
hinges on the court’s acceptance of Advocate General (AG) Jacobs’ guide-
lines in the Doublemint case on assessing whether a mark is descriptive.11 In 
particular, the AG would make an overall assessment of a mark’s registrabil-
ity by examining three non-exhaustive criteria: 
6 Section 11(1)(c) prohibits the registrability of the following: “Trade marks which consist ex-
clusively of signs which may serve, in trade or business, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, 
intended purpose, value, geographical origin, time of production of goods or rendering of services, 
or other characteristics of goods or services.” 
7 Section 11(1)(b) prohibits the registrability of “trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive 
character.” 
8 See n 1 above, p 105.
9 See n 1 above, p 102.
10 See n 2 above, para 25.
11 OHIM v Wrigley Jr Co (“Doublemint”) [2004] 1 WLR 1728 at 1740. Reyes J is not the only judge 
in Hong Kong who finds the AG’s 3 part guidelines persuasive. See Lam J in Guangzhou Green-
enhan Bio-engineering Co v Green Power Health Products [2005] HKEC 513, para 262. 
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•	 “specificity”	 criterion12 – the first criterion concerns the way in 
which a term relates to a product or one of its characteristics. The 
more factual and objective that relationship, the more likely it is 
that the term may be used as a designation in trade;
•	 “immediacy”	criterion	–	 this	 second	criterion	concerns	 the	way	 in	
which a term is perceived: how immediately is the message con-
veyed? The more ordinary, definite and down-to-earth a term is, 
the more readily a consumer will apprehend any designation of a 
characteristic and the more likely the term thus is not to qualify for 
registration as a trade mark; 
•	 “significance	of	 characteristic”	 criterion—the	 third	 criterion	
concerns the significance of the characteristic in relation to the 
product, in particular in the consumer’s mind. Where the charac-
teristic designated is essential or central to the product, or is of a 
particular importance in a consumer’s choice, the case for refusing 
registration is then compelling.13 
According to his Lordship, the state of nakedness might suggest attributes 
which would be desirable in a condom (eg sheerness, colour, weight and 
comfort) but such evocations would require some recourse to subjective 
imagination and furthermore, the link between “nakedness” and the char-
acteristics of a condom was not immediately discernible,14 therefore the 
word “naked” was not descriptive of a characteristic of a condom to be 
deemed non-registrable.
Interestingly, these three-part guidelines were not mentioned at all by 
Reyes J when he decided Re Alldressedup, even though counsel on both 
sides addressed the applicability of the guidelines in their submissions. 
Perhaps his Lordship was aware that Re Naked was going on appeal and in 
particular his reference to AG Jacobs’ guidelines would be in all likelihood 
challenged as misconceived, he decided to err herein on the side of caution 
and omit any reference to the ostensibly offensive guidelines. Instead, his 
Lordship rather cursorily held that the expression “all dressed up” “purely, 
simply and directly designates the purpose”15 of the items of clothing with-
in the relevant classes and thus fell foul of section 11(1)(c) of the TMO. 
In both cases, the learned judge rightly canvassed European Court of Jus-
tice case law, which is binding on the United Kingdom, as Article 3(1)
(b) and (c) of the European Trade Marks Directive, are in pari materia with 
12 Bentley and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (OUP: 2008), p 836.
13 See n 1 above, pp 102–103.
14 See n 1 above, pp 103–104.
15 See n 2 above, para 25.
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section 11(1)(b) and (c) of our TMO. But whilst it is true that the ECJ 
has not expressly endorsed the AG’s guidelines on descriptiveness under 
Article 3(1)(c), it is inaccurate to conclude that all three criteria are in-
consistent with ECJ case law. Certainly, the AG’s third criterion may now 
be legally suspect in light of the ECJ’s dictum in Koninklijke KPN Nederland 
NV v Benelux-Merkenbureau16 where the court had to decide whether the 
word “POSTKANTOOR” (Dutch for “post office”) could be registered for 
various classes of goods and services including inter alia paper, advertising, 
postage stamps, advertising and transport. In particular the ECJ had held 
that:
“It is… irrelevant whether the characteristics of the goods or services which 
may be the subject of the description are commercially essential or merely 
ancillary. The wording of Art 3(1)(c) of the Directive does not draw any dis-
tinction by reference to the characteristics which may be designated by the 
signs or indications of which the mark consists” (emphasis added.)17
As a matter of policy, the ECJ is certainly right on this count. After all, 
there is a strong public interest in allowing any undertaking to freely use 
any indications to describe any characteristic whatsoever of its own goods, 
irrespective of how significant or insignificant that characteristic may be to 
that class of goods.18 By way of example, the term “scent-free” should not be 
registrable as a trade mark for sunscreen lotions, even though the essential 
characteristic of such a sunscreen lotion is to protect the user’s skin against 
sunburn. Nonetheless, it is wrong to assume henceforth that the ECJ has re-
jected the other two criteria suggested by AG Jacobs. In particular, the ECJ 
in Koninklijke in a later passage in the same judgement held that a combina-
tion of words may not be descriptive within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) 
provided that it “creates an impression which is sufficiently far removed from 
that produced by the mere combination of meanings lent by the elements 
of which it is composed, with the result that the word is more than the sum 
of its parts” (emphasis added.)
Therefore, in deciding whether a term is descriptive, the court would 
look at how far removed or in other words how specific a term relates to 
a product or one of its characteristics or how immediate the message con-
veyed by the term is perceived by the consumers as a characteristic of the 
goods. The ECJ has therefore in fewer words accepted as good law the other 
two criteria articulated by AG Jacobs. This is also the approach taken by 
16 [2004] ETMR 57.
17 Ibid, para 99.
18 Ibid, para 102. 
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the Court of First Instance of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities (hereinafter CFI). In assessing whether a mark is descriptive for 
the purposes of registrability under the Directive, the CFI would examine 
whether the “relevant public would immediately and without further re-
flection make a definite and direct association”19 between the mark and a 
characteristic of the class of goods/services in question. 
Once it has been established that the AG’s twin criteria are consistent with 
the ECJ and CFI case law, we can now proceed to examine why, contrary 
to Reyes J’s conclusion, “alldressedup” should be registrable as a trade mark 
for the specifications of goods in Class 14 (jewellery) and Class 18 (articles 
made from animal skins, bags). After all, “alldressedup” would not be used 
commonly in English to specifically describe a characteristic of jewellery or 
a bag, nor is such an association between this mark and the characteristics 
of jewellery, bags or other accessories direct and immediate. Whilst the ex-
pression “all dressed up” conveys the impression that one is properly attired 
for a formal occasion, one does not in usual English parlance refer to an in-
dividual’s use of accessories as dressing up in jewellery or a bag! According 
to common English parlance, we also do not say that the intended purpose 
of jewellery or bags is for dressing individuals up. Instead, “alldressedup” 
alludes to the aura of sophistication that the wearer exudes when they, at-
tired in formal wear, don jewellery or carry an accessory with the applicant’s 
trademark. So whilst Reyes J is right that “alldressedup” is descriptive for 
Class 25 goods (clothing), so far as jewellery and articles made from animal 
skins are concerned, the term “alldressedup” is suggestive and not descrip-
tive. Furthermore, as astutely observed by Yam J in MGA Entertainment Inc 
v Yokon International:20
“The proper question to be considered when considering whether the regis-
tration of a mark is objectionable under section 11(1)(c) of the Ordinance is 
whether it is descriptive of the goods in respect of which the mark is registered. 
The question is, however, not whether the mark is descriptive of that which is 
represented by the goods in respect of which the mark is registered” (emphasis 
added.)21
In the abovementioned case, Yam J rightly held that whilst the mark 
“BRATZ” was a word play on the word “brats” which may be descriptive of 
children, it was clearly not descriptive of dolls or dolls accessories for which 
19 See Dart Industries v OHIM, [2003] ETMR 32, para 26. See also Metso Paper Automation v OHIM, 
(2007) ETMR 2, para 25. 
20 [2006] HKEC 2256.
21 Ibid, para 31.
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a trademark was sought. Similarly, whilst “alldressedup” may be descriptive 
of a lady formally attired in an evening gown, whilst wearing jewellery and 
carrying a bag, the term does not describe any characteristic of jewellery or 
bags. 
Furthermore, in concluding that the expression “alldressedup” “designates 
the purpose of the items of clothing within the relevant classes”, Reyes J 
wrongly assumed that all three classes of goods were concurrent classifica-
tions for different types of clothing. Class 14 includes only jewellery and 
precious stones whilst Class 18 expressly excludes clothing!22
Certainly, the term “alldressedup” is not a lexical invention but that is not 
a requirement for trade mark registration under section 11(1)(b) or (c). 
No European or English Courts have ever imposed such a requirement and 
neither should Hong Kong’s. Combinations of words that are seemingly de-
scriptive of the goods in question may be registrable if there is a “syntactically 
unusual juxtaposition”23 of these terms; but this is not a requirement if the 
word combination by itself is already suggestive rather than descriptive of 
the characteristics of the goods in question. A fortiori, given that Reyes J’s 
finding on section 11(1)(b) distinctiveness rested on the basis the mark 
was “generally descriptive of the goods (here, clothing) within the relevant 
classes”,24 his decision on section 11(1)(b) must also be overturned vis-à-vis 
Class 14 and 18 goods25 if it goes on appeal and the appellate courts agree 
that he erred on section 11(1)(c).
Returning to Re Naked, whilst Reyes J may have erred in finding the AG 
Jacobs’ third “significance of characteristic” criterion persuasive, in his ap-
plication of that criterion, he did not actually conclude that the term “naked” 
alluded to a non-essential characteristic of condoms and was therefore reg-
istrable. Instead, on the facts, all his Lordship held was that the term “naked” 
was not only suggestive of the sheerness of a condom, but also its lightness, 
comfort and transparency.26 As he concluded: 
22 See “Explanatory Note” to the International Classification of Goods and Services under the Nice Agree-
ment (9th edn), available at http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nivilo/nice/index.htm?lang=EN# 
(accessed 21 September 2009).
23 Procter and Gamble v OHIM [2002] Ch. 82 at para 43. In this case, the ECJ had decided that 
“Baby- Dry” is registrable for babies’ nappies on the basis the trade mark is a syntactically unusual 
juxtaposition to describe baby nappies, though one may possibly question whether the term “Baby- 
Dry” is exactly a lexical invention and not descriptive under Art 3(1)(c) of the Directive since 
the intended purpose of the Baby-Dry nappies is to keep every baby dry. No lexical invention is 
patently obvious in the preceding statement. 
24 See n 2 above, para 17. 
25 A mark can be registrable for some classes of goods whilst having its registration refused for an-
other category of goods if it is descriptive of the characteristics of the latter category of goods. See 
DaimlerChrysler v OHIM [2003] ETMR 87, 1050 where TELE AIBID was found descriptive of 
repair services for automobiles but not electrical and electronic devices for transferring speech 
and data.
26 See n 1 above, para 104.
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“The reality is that the word ‘naked’ will suggest different bundles of attributes 
to different persons, depending on the sensibility of their imaginations. The 
characteristics of a condom that might be conveyed by the word ‘naked’ to any 
given person would be variable, elusive and incapable of full articulation.”27
Therefore, whilst his Lordship purported to apply the third criterion, he was 
in actual fact reinforcing the first “specificity” criterion which provides that 
the more imaginative and subjective the relationship between the mark 
and a characteristic of the goods in question, the more acceptable the term 
will be for registration.28 Therefore, as the application of the third criterion 
was in no way decisive for the learned judge in reaching his decision and 
as his adoption and application of the first two criteria were as discussed 
above was beyond reproach, one could hardly argue that the learned judge 
had erred in law in accepting the registrability of the “naked” mark as non-
descriptive under section 11(1)(c) of the TMO and a fortiori capable of 
identifying the said condoms as originating from particular undertaking un-
der section 11(1)(b).
Conclusion 
It is rather surprising that Reyes J would, within a short span of time 
after buying counsel for the applicant’s argument in Re Naked on the 
applicability of AG Jacobs’ guidelines suffer from buyer’s remorse. As 
discussed above, the “specificity” and “immediacy” criteria are con-
sistent with the ECJ and European CFI case law and should not be 
dismissed cursorily. However, at this point of writing, since only Re 
Naked is under appeal, one can only hope that our appellate judges in 
Hong Kong would agree with Reye J’s adoption of the twin criteria ar-
ticulated by AG Jacobs, share his imagination vis-à-vis the suggestive 
nature of the “Naked” mark and uphold the registrability of the mark 
on appeal.
27 Ibid. 
28 See n 1 above, p 102.
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